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Abstract 
 
The design of the agricultural reform in Bulgaria in the early 90-es provides 
researchers with a natural experiment for testing the effect of the protracted absence of 
clearly defined property rights on economic outcomes. Special rules governing the restitution 
of orchards made one group of crops, namely fruits, more susceptible to the negative effects 
of poorly defined property rights, resulting from delayed land reform. Our empirical analysis 
shows that the decline in agricultural output was steepest for crops in the fruits group, which 
we attribute to the differential effect of the property rights vacuum in the early stages of 
transition. 
 
JEL classifications: P26, Q15, D23 
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Introduction 
The effect of property-rights rules on economic outcomes has long been a subject for 
research. In an early classic study, Davies (1971) found that ownership rights affected 
efficiency in Australia’s airline market; Australia’s privately owned airline was significantly 
more efficient than its publicly owned airline. Agnello and Donnelley (1975) found that 
property-rights rules mattered to outcomes in the fisheries; U.S. states that imposed common 
property rights in oyster beds promoted disinvestment and over exploitation compared to 
those states offering exclusive lease arrangements to oyster beds. More recently, Li, Rozelle, 
and Scott (1998) have shown that longer-term rights to use land encourage land-saving 
investment while Mendelsohn (1994) has shown how poorly defined property rights, and 
even small probabilities of land-user eviction, lead to wasteful deforestation. Thus, whether 
on land, in the air or in the sea, property rights and their characteristics matter for economic 
outcomes.  
The steep output declines in most Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries in 
the early stages of transition (World Bank, 2002, p. 5)a period characterized by protracted 
transfer of productive resources from collective to private ownershiphas reignited 
academic interest in the importance of property rights for economic outcomes. In an 
influential study of the patterns of transition, De Melo, Denizer, and Gelb (1996) examine 
output and inflation outcomes in CEE countries in the early stages of transition. Using the 
Cumulative Liberalization Index (CLI)
2 over the period 1989-1994 to capture the intensity 
and duration of policy reforms, the authors conclude that “…rapid reform is preferable to 
slow reform, given the breakdown in the central planning apparatus.” (De Melo et al., 1996, 
p. 27). Furthermore, the ongoing debate on the comparative advantages and disadvantages of 
different privatization methods
3 center around their potential to establish clear-cut property 
rights that would foster economic incentives. An important strand of this literature examines 
the choice of land reform policies in CEE countries (Lerman, Csaki, and Feder, 2002, 
Chapter 2; Swinnen, 1999; Swinnen, Buckwell, and Mathijs, 1997; Szelenyi, 1998; Swinnen, 
1997). 
At the start of the transition, most of the land in CEE countries with the exception of 
Poland and former Yugoslavia, was farmed collectively by large state farms and 
cooperatives
4 (Lerman, Csaki, and Feder, 2002, pp. 23-26). In the first years of transition, all 
CEE countries instituted policies for privatization/decollectivization of agricultural 
                                                 
2 Constructed as a composite measure of the extent of policy reforms in the areas of internal 
markets, external markets, and enterprize privatization. Summing up the CLI values for a 
country over a period of time ensures that slow reformers receive lower ranks than countries 
that liberalize early on. 
3 For an ex post review of country experiences see World Bank, 2002, Chapter 7. 
4 In the former, all productive assets belonged to the state, whereas in the latter they were 
jointly owned by the members of the cooperative, who were not, however, allowed to leave 
voluntarily. 
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production,
5 most of which were based on restitution of the land to its owners prior to the 
nationalization/collectivization. In practice, however, the return of the land to its previous 
owners proceeded slowly in the course of the following years, mired in technical and 
organizational difficulties (Lerman, Csaki, and Feder, 2002, p. 73). Over the same period, 
agricultural production fell sharply in all CEE countries. Between 1989 and 1992, the 
cumulative decline in gross agricultural output (i.e. crops and livestock) was respectively 5% 
in Albania, 18% in Bulgaria, 22% in the Czech Republic, 29% in Hungary, 17% in Poland, 
15% in Romania, and 25% in the Slovak Republic (OECD, 1998). In an important article, 
Macours and Swinnen (2000) identify the spell of poorly defined property rights, resulting 
from delays in land reforms, as a contributing factor to the observed declines in agricultural 
output in the early stages of transition: 
“A slow privatization process prolongs the uncertainty of property rights. As 
long as property rights are uncertain, markets cannot develop and the 
decapitalization of agriculture continues through the liquidation of productive 
assets, including the slaughtering of livestock, and a reduction of investment and 
maintenance.” (Macours and Swinnen, 2000, p. 179) 
In the empirical part of the paper, however, Macours and Swinnen attribute the 
observed output declines to a combination of adverse changes in the terms-of-trade and 
climate conditions, and the effects of: (i) privatization prior to the transition agricultural 
organizations faced with soft budget constraints used excess amounts of inputs. Under such 
conditions, privatization would lead to a more efficient allocation of resources that would 
initially lead to a fall of output, but over time would boost productivity; (ii) uncertainty 
associated with the institution of major policy changes (i.e. the heighten risk associated with 
policy changes increases marginal costs of inputs, which leads to a decrease of output, but 
does not affect the production efficiency); (iii) the disruption caused by the change in 
cultivation methods – from large-scale collective to individual farms. None of these factors 
captures the hypothesized negative effect on agricultural output of the spell of poorly defined 
property rights resulting from delays in land reforms.  
In this paper, we isolate and test the significance of the effect of the protracted 
absence of clearly defined property rights on economic outcomes in transitional countries, 
using the Bulgarian experience as a case study. Section I reviews the rules governing the 
transfer of property rights in Bulgarian agriculture and their practical implementation. 
Section II argues that the Bulgarian experience provides researchers with a natural 
experiment for testing the effects of poorly defined property rights on economic outcomes. 
Section III presents the results from the statistical tests of the hypothesis in univariate setting. 
In Section IV we perform regression analysis of the hypothesis in a demand-supply 
                                                 
5 For a review of past and current agricultural policies in CEE countries see OECD, 
Agricultural Policies in Emerging and Transition Economies. Monitoring And Evaluation, 
various issues. 
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framework that satisfies the ceteris paribus condition embedded in the tested hypothesis. 
Section V summarizes the main conclusions of the paper. 
I.   Property-Rights Rules in Bulgarian Agriculture During the Transition 
 
The Law on Agricultural Land Ownership and Agricultural Land Use (LALOALU) 
and the Rules for Implementation of LALOALU (Rules) were adopted in 1991 and 
subsequently frequently amended. Their main objective was the return (restitution) of 
agricultural land to the individuals (or their heirs), who held title on it following the land 
reform of 1946 but prior to the collectivization (Buckwell, Davidova and Trendafilov, 1994, 
p. 57-61). A 1992 amendment in both acts also provided for the parallel liquidation 
(dissolution) of the Labor-Agricultural Co-operatives (LACs) – the organizations that 
previously managed the land.
6 Under the new provisions, the management of LACs was 
transferred to externally appointed Liquidation Councils whose responsibilities were to: (1) 
establish the total value of LAC’s non-land assets and based on this appraisal, lowered by the 
value of LAC’s debts to the government, banks, other firms and individuals, determine the 
monetary equivalent of the share
7 of each member of the co-operative in LAC’s non-land 
assets; (2) auction all LAC’s assets to the members of the co-operative, who bid among 
themselves with the paper value of their respective shares in LAC’s assets; (3) sell in an open 
auction the assets not claimed by the members of the co-operative and remit the received 
cash to them, effectively completing the liquidation of LAC (Rules for Implementation of 
LALOALU, Articles 48, 48a, 49, 49a).  
Importantly, the Law on Agricultural Land Ownership and Agricultural Land Use and 
the Rules for Implementation of LALOALU put the restitution of land cultivated with fruit-
bearing trees under a different regime than the land used for growing other agricultural crops. 
In particular, Article 56, Paragraph 7 of the Rules stipulates that the owners of land, currently 
planted with fruit-bearing trees, can enter into possession only after paying the Liquidation 
Council the value of the trees on their property. In addition, Article 18 of LALOALU forbids 
the new owners to destroy the trees before the end of their depreciation schedule and 
mandates that they perform all agro-technical and agro-chemical procedures necessary for 
the trees’ maintenance.  
In design, the processes of restitution and liquidation should have evolved in parallel. 
In practice however, the return of land proved to be extremely complex and slow: 
“By June 1993, the MLCs [Municipal Land Councils] had issued 1,346,604 certificates 
recognizing, in one form or another, ownership of claimants on about 4.2 million ha (75% of area 
claimed). Outside the mountainous and semi-mountainous regions, the ownership of a particular 
                                                 
6 For a detailed description of the different pre-reform agricultural organizations in Bulgaria 
see Davidova, Buckwell and Kopeva, 1997, p. 24-27. 
7 The relative size of the shares of the members of the co-operative is determined by a 
formula that gives equal weights to the amount of land that they have contributed and their 
length of service in the co-operative (Rules for Implementation of LALOALU, Article 50). 
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area could only be recognized after land surveys and the creation of a land division plan. In fact, 
only about 4000 such decisions enabling restoration of ownership were issued. These covered 
18,000 ha (0.3% of the claimed area). In the mountainous and semi-mountainous TBSs [territory 
belonging to a settlement], the old land boundaries either still existed or they could easily be 
restored. Thus, land surveys were not necessary and 400,000 certificates were issued recognizing 
the ownership claimed on 533,000 ha (9.6% of claimed land). Thus, in total, not more than 10% 
of the area claimed could be said to be restored by mid-June 1993. …The land restitution 
procedure is complicated by the issue of final title to land. By the end of June 1993, only 580 
final titles to land had been issued on 550 ha, with an average area of 0.9 ha.” (Buckwell, 
Davidova and Trendafilov, 1994, p. 62-63). 
Thus, the hurried liquidation of the old agricultural organizations and the delayed 
restitution of the land created a property rights vacuum. In the interim period, the land was 
managed by the Liquidation Councils, which either cultivated it by mobilizing the members 
of the co-operative or temporarily leased it to individuals who had claims on land in the same 
geographic location, but the exact boundaries of their plots had not yet been determined. 
Regrettably, neither the lessees, nor the Liquidation Councils had any incentives to invest or 
maintain the capital that existed on the land (irrigation systems, trees, etc.). This was due, in 
part, to their short planning horizon (Buckwell, Davidova and Trendafilov, 1994, p. 65), and 
in part to the unstable macroeconomic environment. The annual rate of inflation in the period 
1991-1997 remained above 50%, nominal interest rates were extremely high (in the range of 
37% in 1995 and 192% in 1996 for the discount rate), the real per capita income shrunk 
significantly and the domestic currency rapidly depreciated (IMF, 1996, p. 6 and 43; IMF, 
2000). The combination of these factors made the prospect of locking money in fixed assets, 
such as trees, extremely unattractive. Thus, the owners of land planted with trees had much 
higher incentives than their peers to fully depreciate the capital on their land (through 
negligence or outright sabotage) before the final transfer of title occurred: 
“Land restitution has proceeded rapidly in the primary fruit-growing regions. Many new 
landowners have acquired orchards that are in very poor condition (many trees are long overdue 
for replacement), partly because of neglect by the liquidation Councils. To add insult to injury, 
the new owners are required to compensate the liquidation Councils for the orchards’ value. In 
theory, the owners will get some of their payments back when the liquidation Councils finish 
distributing collective assets. In the meantime, they cannot make enough money from the sale of 
fruit to cover these debts. In response, some owners are destroying the orchards, replanting the 
land with grain or other crops perceived as being more profitable.” (Cochrane, Schmitz and 
Bojnec, 1994, p. 49). 
II.   Tested Hypothesis 
 
The design of the agricultural reform in Bulgaria provides researchers with a natural 
experiment for testing the effect of the protracted absence of clearly defined property rights 
on economic outcomes. As seen in Section I, the hurried liquidation of the old agricultural 
organizations and the delayed restitution of the land created a spell of poorly defined 
property rights. Furthermore, special rules governing the restitution of land cultivated with 
fruit-bearing trees made one group of crops, namely fruits, much more susceptible to the 
negative effect of poorly defined property rights on agricultural output. We can, therefore, 
test for the presence, sign and magnitude of the effect of poorly defined property rights on 
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economic outcomes by examining the groupwise differences in the decline of output from 
different groups of crops (fruits, vegetables and cereals)
8 during the transition in Bulgaria. 
Under the null hypothesis of no such effect, everything else being equal, the pairwise 
differences between the declines of output from the three groups of crops should be 
statistically insignificant. If the null hypothesis is rejected at a prespecified level of 
confidence, we can proceed testing the hypothesis that the decline in the output of fruit is the 
largest among all analyzed groups of crops.
9 
III.   Univariate Analysis 
 
In our analysis, we use data for the period 1979-1996.
10 The turning point in the 
political and economic development of Bulgaria was the ousting from power of the long-time 
leader of the Bulgarian Communist Party Thodor Zhivkov in November 1989 (for a review 
of the political developments in Bulgaria in the period 1989-1994, see Swinnen, 1997). Thus, 
we use the 1979-89 data as a yardstick for evaluating the performance of the Bulgarian 
agriculture in the transition.
11 
                                                 
8 Industrial crops (e.g. sunflower seeds, groundnuts, seed cotton, etc.) have been screened out 
of the present analysis, because of the different nature of interaction between this agricultural 
sub-sector and the industrial sector of the economy, which substantially complicates any 
comparative analysis between industrial crops and the other types of crops. 
9 Production of other crops was also negatively affected by the protracted spell of poorly 
defined property rights but to a lesser extent. Besides fruits, which production depends 
crucially upon capital (trees) specific to the land, cereals are also highly capital-intensive 
crops. Their melioration, cultivation and harvesting require the use of heavy machinery 
(tractors and combines). However, this capital equipment is not affixed to specific parcels of 
land and so it was exposed to a lesser extent to the negative effects of poorly defined 
property rights (as it could have been kept under key or sold much faster than the land). 
Vegetables, on the other hand, are the most labor-intensive crops, despite the fact that they 
also require some capital equipment in the form of irrigation systems and greenhouses. 
Consequently, vegetables production should be least affected by the chaos of transition. 
10 The source of all agricultural and meteorological data is the Statistical Yearbook of the 
Republic of Bulgaria, published by the National Statistics Institute. The macroeconomic data 
is from the IMF’s publication “World Economic Outlook.” 
11 The ten-year span of the reference period assures that it adequately reflects the pre-
transitional situation in the agricultural sector, in light of the high year-to-year variability in 
agricultural production. The last year covered in our analysis is 1996, as the decapitalization 
in the sector, caused by the lack of clearly defined property rights, took place in the first 
years of transition and then gradually subsided (i.e. while the number of tractors and 
combines used in agriculture steadily declined in the period 1990 and 1995 for an overall 
drop of close to 54 percent, 1996 was the first year following the start of the restitution 
program that witnessed an increase in their numbers. In that year nearly all land was already 
under private cultivation). 
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Over the seven years following the start of market reforms in Bulgaria, the average 
annual production of fruits, cereals and vegetables fell by 43, 20 and 14 percent from their 
respective pre-transitional values (Table 1). On the supply side, the differential collapse in 
aggregate output from the three groups of crops can be traced to declines of similar 
magnitudes in productivity (i.e. average crop yield) and in the case of fruits – to a decrease in 
orchards’ acreage. In agreement with the hypothesis put forth in this paper, the different 
transfer rules may have indeed yielded differential output effects during the transition. 
Table 1. Bulgarian Agricultural Production During the Transition 
 
Indicators  Average 
1979-89  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Percentage difference 
between post and pre-
transitional averages 
Agricultural output 
a/            
  -  Cereals  8091 8013 8872 6497 5629 6388 6492 3357  -20 
  -  Vegetables  1856 1789 1736 1679 1164 1645 2053 1147  -14 
  -  Fruits  824 797 453 548 296 315 422 469  -43 
Land under collective and private 
cultivation 
b/            
  -  Cereals  20477 20069 22042 21824 22269 22701 21025 17468  3 
  -  Vegetables  1248 1173 1220 1287 1065 1336 1683 1109  2 
  -  Fruits  667 559 569 584 590 540 498 489  -18 
Average crop yield from land under 
collective and private cultivation 
c/            
  -  Cereals  298 301 315 249 197 232 246 160  -19 
  -  Vegetables  1234 1263 1232 1209  957 1032 1064  920  -11 
  -  Fruits  651 641 363 416 293 233 259 472  -41 
Real producer prices 
d/             
  -  Cereals  10133  10110 3895 7301 4606 2480 1620  n.a  -51 
  -  Vegetables  18119  20951 7794  14595 9854 5241 3450  n.a  -43 
  -  Fruits  20730 21586  8627 17175 11491  6187  4017  n.a  -44 
Source: National Statistical Institute, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, and authors’ 
estimates. 
 
a/ Combined output in thousand tons from the agricultural crops in our sample representing each group of crops: 
Cereals – wheat, rye, barley, oats, and maize; Vegetables – tomatoes, green peppers, onions, green beans, potatoes, 
and melons; and Fruits – apples, pears, plums, cherries, apricots, and peaches. 
b/ Thousand of dekars. 
c/ Average yield in kg/dekar among crops from each group of crops. 
d/ 1995 leva per metric ton. 
To evaluate the statistical significance of the observed differences in the average 
output decline, productivity loss and change in the amount of cultivated land across the three 
groups of crops, we use Repeated Measures ANOVA in testing the equality of group means 
(Table 2).  
The Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance is appropriate when the dataset 
includes more than one realization of a variable for the same subject (e.g. yearly values of 
total output from a given crop). In testing the equality of group means, the Repeated 
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Measures ANOVA accounts for the fact that the intertemporal values of variables for an 
individual crop are likely to be correlated, by explicitly modeling the covariance structure of 
these intertemporal values.
12  
Given the nature of the raw datathe annual production of crops included in our 
sample ranges from several thousand (e.g. rye, pears, etc.) to several million (e.g. wheat, 
maize, etc.) tons per yearsuch analysis requires the use of a measure of agricultural output 
which values are of comparable scale across crops. We construct such measure by 
transforming the output series for each crop in our sample into an index with a base equal to 
the average output from that crop prior to the transition (the other variables are transformed 
in a similar manner).
13 The comparison of the group means of these indices over the period 
1990-96, using Repeated-measures Analysis of Variance, shows that the average output 
decline among crops belonging to the fruits’ group is larger
14 than those among crops from 
the cereals’ and vegetables’ groups. The observed differences in the average output declines 
among fruits, cereals and vegetables were caused by statistically significant differences in the 
average yields derived from the different types of crops, with fruits experiencing the biggest 
average loss of productivity. The observed changes in the amounts of land cultivated with the 
three groups of crops were not statistically significant. 
The performed statistical analysis rejects the null hypothesis of no significant 
differences in the output declines from three groups of crops. Moreover, the statistically 
significant differences in the average output declines among fruits and vegetables, and fruits 
and cereals are plausibly explained by our analysis of the special rules governing the 
restitution of orchards that made them more susceptible to the negative effect of poorly 






                                                 
12 In our analysis, we assume the most general form of the covariance matrix, estimating 
different covariance parameters for each pair of equally spaced-out intertemporal values. 
13 The choice of a base for the indices reflects the high year-to-year variability in agricultural 
production, which precludes us from using the values of agricultural output from different 
crops in one particular year as reference values. The reason for this is that if the latter are not 
representative of the annual production from each crop in our sample, the resulting pooled 
series of output indices for fruits, vegetables and cereals will exhibit spurious dynamics. 
14 In the following discussion, statements on differences in group means of variables are 
based on repeated measures ANOVA F-tests of the equality of group means. The use of 
terms “larger”, “smaller” and, the likes of, imply that our statistical analysis has shown that 
the reported differences in group means are statistically significant at the 90% level of 
confidence. 
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Table 2. Repeated-Measures ANOVA Analysis 
 
Group means  F-statistics in repeated measures ANOVA 
tests of the differences in group means  Indicators / Year 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
C, V & F  C & V  C & F  V & F 
 
Index of agricultural production 
from land under collective and 
private cultivation 









  - Cereals  105  110  98  79  90  77  47         
  - Vegetables  89  95  102  68  95  133  75         
  - Fruits  100  66  79  44  52  57  63         
                    
 
Index of land under collective and 
private cultivation 









  - Cereals  96  104  106  107  106  93  82         
  - Vegetables  91  93  101  82  100  132  89         
  - Fruits  83  85  89  90  84  76  75         
                    
 
Index of average crop yield from 
land under collective and private 
cultivation 









  - Cereals  108  106  93  72  85  84  58       
  - Vegetables  101  108  104  80  91  96  79       
  - Fruits  100  61  70  50  41  44  78       
                    
 
Index of real producer prices 
(average 1979-89 real producer 









  - Cereals  100  39  65  46  25  16  n.a.       
  - Vegetables  115  43  81  55  29  19  n.a.       
  - Fruits  102  41  81  54  29  19  n.a.       
                                     
Numbers in parenthesis are P-values. 
 
 
IV.   Multivariate Analysis 
 
In the preceding section, we have established the presence of statistically significant 
differences in the average output declines among fruits, vegetables, and cereals. To be able to 
attribute conclusively these differences to the differential effect of poorly defined property 
rights on different groups of crops, however, we need to account for other factors affecting 
agricultural production in a demand-supply framework that would satisfy the ceteris paribus 
condition embedded in our tested hypothesis. 
Review of empirical literature 
 
   11 
Previous studies of the causes of agricultural output declines in CEE countries in the 
early stages of transition were based on cross-country data either in a point of time or in a 
panel (Macours and Swinnen, 1999; Macours and Swinnen, 2000).  
Following the pioneering work of De Melo, et al. (1997), Macours and Swinnen 
(1999) use a cross-section of transitional countries to analyze the importance of initial 
conditions, reform policy choices, and policy outcomes for the realizations of the gross 
agricultural output (GAO) after 5 years of reforms. The OLS-estimated GAO supply function 
is in a semi-log form and includes as explanatory variables the ratio of producer prices to 
input prices, the share of land cultivated by individual farms, and a dummy variable for 
whether effective use rights on the land were restored during the reform period. The authors 
do not discuss the demand side of the system.  
Macours and Swinnen (2000) use panel data on CEE countries over the period 1989-
1995 to estimate with OLS a semi-log supply function for aggregate output from five crops 
(wheat, maize, barley, sugar beet, and oilseeds), aggregated using world market prices. 
Explanatory variables are the lagged value of the ratio of producer prices to input prices; the 
share of land cultivated by individual farms; the share of privatized land; the share of land 
newly cultivated by individual farms in the current and preceding years; the rainfall in the 
period March-June; and a dummy variable for whether major policy changes took place 
during the year that captures the impact of uncertainty. The OLS estimation is justified by the 
use of a lagged terms-of-trade term, based on the assumed adaptive expectations of agents. 
Model specification 
 
In this paper, we estimate separate supply functions for cereals, vegetables, and fruits, 
using Two-Stage Least Squares (TSLS) that allow identification of the supply function in a 
system of simultaneous demand and supply equations. The selection of explanatory variables 
is based on the work of Macours and Swinnen (1999 and 2000), country reports on Bulgarian 
agriculture, and analysis of the data. As seen in Table 3, the across-the-board decline in 
agricultural output in Bulgaria was accompanied by a significant deterioration in the terms-
of-trade between agriculture and the rest of the economy. Average real producer prices of 
fruits, vegetables and cereals all fell precipitously, with cereals faring worst.
15 This suggests 
that the demand schedules for fruits, vegetables and cereals alike were subjected to common 
negative external shocks - the loss of CMEA export markets and the decline in domestic 





                                                 
15 Throughout most of the period, there was a partial export ban on cereals that combined 
with government monitoring of retail margins on basic food products depressed the prices of 
agricultural commodities (IMF 1996, p. 5). 
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Table 3. Demand and Supply Factors Affecting Agricultural Production in Bulgaria 
 
Indicators  Average 
1979-89  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Percentage difference 
between post and pre-
transitional averages 
            
Supply Factors            
Land under private cultivation (%)                   
  -  Cereals  13 17 26 26 28 42 46 97  622 
a/ 
  -  Vegetables  46 54 66 78 89 93 93 99  116 
a/ 
  -  Fruits  3  4  5 16 23 46 50 97  2992 
a/ 
Average annual temperature 
b/  11.4 12.2 10.8 11.6 11.4 12.9 11.5 11.0  2 
Average annual precipitation 
c/  543 418 618 405 464 463 684 553  -5 
            
Demand Factors            
Real per capita GDP 
d/  112  116  103 95 93 95 97 87  -13 
Exports  (mln.  USD)            
 - Cereals  74  27  53  78  13  5  124  4  -41 
  -  Vegetables  181 59 36 50 22 40 40 33  -78 
  -  Fruits  103 41 15 19 20 68 36 26  -69 
            





d/ Thousands 1995 leva. 
 
Furthermore, Table 3 reveals substantial differences in the organization of 
agricultural production of fruits, vegetables and cereals prior to the transition and its 
evolution thereafter. Over the period 1979-89, on average 46 percent of the land planted with 
vegetables was cultivated by individual farmers under contract with agricultural co-
operatives, while the corresponding figure for cereals was 13 percent, and only 3 percent for 
fruits. Different dynamics of transfer of land from collective to private cultivation can induce 
differential output responses (see discussion later in the section). 
Therefore, in our regression analysis we use data on 16 agricultural crops
16 and on 
selected meteorological and macroeconomic variables over the period 1990-95 
17 to estimate 
the following supply functions for cereals, vegetables, and fruits: 
 
                                                 
16 In the original dataset, the cereals group was represented by wheat, rye, barley, oats, and 
maize; the vegetables group – by tomatoes, green peppers, onions, green beans, and melons; 
and the fruit group – by apples, pears, plums, cherries, apricots, and peaches. The selection of 
agricultural crops reflects data availability. In the course of the regression analysis, potatoes 
were removed from the cereals group, due to implausible (i.e. outlier) values of real producer 
prices. The removal of potatoes from the cereals group did not affect the main findings of our 
analysis.  
17 The data series on producer prices end in 1995. 










it TEMP RAIN SHPRIVCULT REALPRC OUTPUT ε ϕ δ γ β α + + + + + = . . . .  (1) 
 
[] Fruits Vegetables Cereals j   ,   , ∈  
[] 1995   ...,   , 1991   , 1990 ∈ t  
[] Cereals j i = ∈ for     ,   maize   oats,   barley,   rye,   wheat,  
[] Vegetables j i = ∈ for     ,   melons   beans, green    onions,   peppers, green     tomatoes,  
[] Fruits j i = ∈ for     ,   peaches   apricots,   cherries,   plums,   pears,   apples,  
 
 
The definitions and measurement-units of the dependent and explanatory variables
18 
in the original dataset were: 
OUTPUT – crop output (thousand tons). 
REALPRC – Real producer prices (1995 leva per metric ton). Deflated using CPI. 
SHPRIVCULT – share of land under private cultivation (%).
19 
RAIN – Average annual precipitation
20 (millimeters per square meter). 
TEMP – Average annual temperature
20 (degrees Celsius). 
 
 
The endogenous variables in (1) are OUTPUT and REALPRC. In the estimation of 
(1) with TSLS, we use as instruments all exogenous explanatory variables (
j
it SHPRIVCULT t, 
                                                 
18 The source of all data is the National Statistical Institute in Bulgaria, except for the data on 
producer prices that comes from the FAOSTAT database of the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations. 
19 Prior to 1989, most of the land classified as being under private cultivation was land 
owned by the agricultural co-operatives, which had been leased to their members. Starting in 
1990, this category began to reflect the temporary leasing of plots of land by the Liquidation 
Councils to individuals, who had claims on land in the same geographic location, but the 
exact boundaries of their plots had not yet been determined. Later on, most of the land under 
this category constituted plots returned to their owners without issuance of final title to the 
land. 
20 The National Statistical Institute reports data on the average annual precipitation and 
temperature at a number of meteorological stations in Bulgaria. We first take a simple 
average of these values by agricultural region (Bulgaria is divided in three agricultural 
regions - Northern Bulgaria, Southern Bulgaria, SouthWestern). We then calculate the 
weighted average of these regional means, using as weights each region’s share in the total 
arable land in Bulgaria. 
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RAIN t, TEMP t), the lagged endogenous variables (OUTPUT and  ), and the 




it REALPRC 1 −
21 
As mentioned earlier, the annual production of crops included in our sample ranges 
from several thousand tons per year (e.g. rye, pears, etc.) to several million (e.g. wheat, 
maize, etc.). Given the pooled nature of the dataset and the fact that our analysis focuses on 
groupwise differences in output declines rather than on the fixed effects associated with 
individual crops, we first have to ensure that the values of our measure of agricultural output 
are of comparable scale across crops. We construct such measure by transforming the output 
series for each crop in our sample into an index with a base equal to the average output from 
that crop prior to the transition (i.e. in the period 1979-1989). All explanatory variables are 
also transformed in a similar manner to enable easy interpretation of OLS coefficients.
22 
Macours and Swinnen (1999 and 2000) make similar normalization of the raw data, noting 
that it helps eliminate heteroskedasticity in the data and “…reduces possible measurement 
biases due to different statistical methods in the different countries or due to omitted country-
specific variables like climate or soil quality” (Macours and Swinnen, 2000, p.185). 
We estimate (1) in levels rather than in log or semi-log form, because the rationale of 
the latter in the current context is questionable. Traditionally, regressions have been 
estimated in log form as a convenient way of casting the OLS coefficients as one period 
growth elasticities. Taking logs of variables that are already normalized around their pre-
transitional averages, however, renders the normalization irrelevant for the interpretation of 
regression coefficients. In our regression analysis, the normalization of the dependent and 
explanatory variables is paramount in allowing us to use regression coefficients to compare 
post with pre-transitional outcomes in the Bulgarian agriculture. Therefore, the estimation of 
(1) is in levels rather than logarithmic or semi-logarithmic form. 
Expected signs of regression coefficients 
 
Given that the estimated regressions represent supply functions for fruits, vegetables 
and cereals, we expect a positive association between agricultural output and real producer 
prices. In our analysis, we deflate producer prices by CPI, instead of using the index of prices 
of inputs in agricultural production as per (Macours and Swinnen, 1999 and 2000). Whereas, 
                                                 
21 In the initial stages of our exploratory analysis, we also used the real exchange rate of the 
Bulgarian Lev to the US Dollar, estimated using the respective GDP deflators, as an 
instument. It was later removed from the set of instuments, as it had little explanatory power 
on real producer prices but introduced multicollinearity, by being negatively associated with 
real per capita income. The removal did not affect the main findings of our analysis. 
22 The indices of climatic conditions have bases equal to their respective average values over 
the entire sample period (i.e. 1979-1995), as these variables were not affected by the chaos 
brought by the transition. 
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the index of input prices
23 in agriculture published by OECD for each transitional country 
can be useful in cross-country analysis, it is not meaningful in a sectoral analysis within a 
country. The reason for this is that the index reflects the average use of inputs in all 
agricultural sectors, whereas the intensity of their use varies substantially depending on the 
nature of the crops. 
Climatic conditions (i.e. higher average temperatures and increased rainfall) are 
expected to have a positive effect on agricultural output.  
On theoretical grounds, the effect of the transfer of land from collective to private 
cultivation on agricultural output in Bulgaria is indeterminate. The extreme segmentation of 
agricultural land resulting from the restitution process, and the absence of developed market 
infrastructure deprived private farmers in Bulgaria of the economies of scale and the ample 
financing enjoyed in the past. Also, throughout most of the period private farmers did not 
have final title on the land. Without such title, they were not able to sell their land or use it as 
collateral for bank loans. These factors can be expected to reduce the agricultural output of 
land transferred from collective to private cultivation. On the other hand, private cultivation 
with exclusive claim to output provides farmers with incentives that might increase output. 
When Chinese collectives leased plots of land for private cultivation, output increased 
dramatically. Thus, the effect of transfer of land into private cultivation is an empirical issue 
(see Lerman, Csaki, and Feder, 2002 for a review of experiences in other transitional 
countries).  
The effect of the spell of poorly defined property rights, resulting from delays in land 
reforms, on agricultural output in Bulgaria would, instead, be captured by differences in the 
constant terms in the three regressions. The constant terms in the three supply functions show 
how the average post-1989 output would have compared to its pre-transitional average 
values, if the other explanatory variables are held constant. We have already established that 
special rules governing the restitution of land cultivated with fruit-bearing trees have made 
one group of crops, namely fruits, much more susceptible to the negative effect of poorly 
defined property rights on agricultural output. Therefore, if this effect is significant factor for 
the observed output decline, we would expect that the constant term in the supply function 
for fruits to be smaller than the constant terms in the other two supply functions, reflecting 
the non-random and all-encompassing nature of the negative effect of poorly defined 
property rights on agricultural output. 
Regression analysis 
 
Table 4 presents the output from the TSLS estimation of the supply functions of 
fruits, vegetables and cereals in Bulgaria in the period 1990-1995. All pooled variables used 
in the regression analysis were tested for stationarity using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
                                                 
23 OECD’s input prices index is a composite measure of the prices of combined fodder, 
nitrogenous fertilisers, phosphate fertilisers, herbicides, fungicides, tractors, and combines 
(see OECD, 2000, p. 161). 
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and in all cases the hypothesis of the presence of an unit-root was rejected at the 95% level of 
confidence. All reported standard errors of regression coefficients are adjusted for the 
presence of general heteroskedasticity in regression residuals inherent in cross-sectional 
models. The three regressions are estimated independently of one another, as a priori there is 
no reason to believe that the effect of explanatory variables would be the same for fruits, 
vegetables and cereals. All explanatory variables are retained in the final specification of the 
regressions to facilitate the comparison between them. 
As seen in Table 4, the constant term in the supply function for fruits is the smallest 
of the three constants, with the difference between it and the constants in the supply functions 
for vegetables and cereals being statistically significant at the 99 percent level of confidence 
(the constant in the supply function for fruits is the only one that is statistically different from 
zero at any of the conventional confidence levels). This result reinforces the findings of the 
univariate analysis in the preceding section, by showing that even after accounting for 
various supply and demand factors influencing agricultural production, we are able to show 
that the supply of fruits in the early stages of transition in Bulgaria fared worst relative to 
other crops. Therefore, we can attribute with high degree of confidence the much steeper 
decline in fruits’ output to the stronger effect that the spell of poorly defined property rights 
had on orchards, as a result of the special rules governing the restitution of land cultivated 
with fruit-bearing trees.  
Turning to the other explanatory variables, we note that the regression coefficients in 
front of climatic conditions have the expected positive signs in all three regressions, but are 
statistically significant only in the supply function for fruits.  
The transfer of land from collective to private cultivation, on the other hand, has a 
negative effect on agricultural output, the latter being statistically insignificant from zero in 
the cereals supply function. Thus, inefficiencies of private farming during the early stages of 
transition in Bulgaria more than offset any output gains associated with improved incentives.  
None of the structural explanatory variables enters significantly in the regression of 
the supply of cereals. This comes as no surprize given the fact that cereals were the most 
heavily regulated among agricultural commodities -bread being the national staple food - 
with numerous restrictions on their export, ceilings on retail margins, special producers’ 
incentives, etc. Instead, cereals’ output is strongly correlated with its value in the preceding 
period, reflecting government’s efforts to ensure the national food balance in each year, by 
adjusting its regulations and level of subsidies to producers. The ad hoc addition of the 
lagged output as an explanatory variable does not change the above comparison of the 
constant terms in the three regressions, as without it the constant term in the supply function 




                                                 
24 The exact value of the constant was 61.4 with standard error of 178.3. 
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Table 4. TSLS Estimation of Supply Functions of Fruits, Vegetables, 
and Cereals in Bulgaria, 1990-95 
  
Index of production (average 1979-89 output=100) 
Regressors / Dependent variables 
Cereals Fruits  Vegetables 
     
Constant  7.03   -273.4 *  -38.3 
  (138)  (128)  (144) 
     
Index of real producer prices  
(average 1979-89 real producer prices=100) 
 0.05 
 (0.31) 




     
Index of land under private cultivation 





 -0.37 * 
 (0.08) 
     








     
Index of precipitation 
(average annual precipitation 1979-96=100) 
 0.13 
 (0.4) 




     
Lagged index of production 
(average 1979-89 output=100) 
 0.49 * 
 (0.17)  - - 
      
           
Data points  30  36  30 
Adjusted R-squared 
a/ 0.21  0.51  0.22 
Durbin-Watson 1.93  1.98 
b/ 2.28 
AR(1)  -   0.40 *  - 
 -  (0.16)  - 
           
Numbers in parenthesis are White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors of regression coefficients. 
* Statistically significant at the 95% level of confidence. 
a/ Not using OLS. R-squared is not bounded in [0,1]. 
b/ After correction for first-order correlation in regression residuals. 
 
 
V.   Conclusion 
 
Detailed analysis of the legislative basis of land reform in Bulgaria suggests that it 
provides researchers with a natural experiment for testing the effects of poorly defined 
property rights on economic outcomes. Different treatment for land cultivated with fruit-
bearing trees in the process of restitution in Bulgaria made fruit production much more 
susceptible to the negative effects of poorly defined property rights on agricultural output. In 
both univariate and multivariate setting (i.e. controlling for various demand and supply 
factors), we are able to show that as a result the decline in agricultural output was steepest for 
crops in the fruits group. Therefore, the Bulgarian agricultural experience shows that 
property rights and their characteristics matter to economic outcomes. 
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